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OPINION 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Deborah Hansler requested intermittent leave from her 
former employer, Lehigh Valley Health Network (“Lehigh 
Valley”), under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.1 
Specifically, Hansler submitted a medical certification 
                                              
1 The case name incorrectly refers to Lehigh Valley Health 
Network as Lehigh Valley Hospital Network. 
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requesting leave for two days a week for approximately one 
month. As alleged in the complaint, the medical certification 
refers to the length of her requested leave but not the nature 
or duration of her condition. A few weeks later, after she took 
several days off work, Lehigh Valley terminated Hansler’s 
employment without seeking any clarification about her 
medical certification, as required by law. Lehigh Valley cited 
excessive absences and informed her that the request for leave 
had been denied. Hansler sued Lehigh Valley for violations of 
the Medical Leave Act, and the District Court dismissed the 
complaint on the basis that the medical certification 
supporting Hansler’s request for leave was “invalid.” We 
conclude that, by alleging that Lehigh Valley terminated her 
instead of affording her a chance to cure any deficiencies in 
her medical certification, Hansler has stated a claim that 
Lehigh Valley violated the Medical Leave Act. Accordingly, 
we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
 Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011 to work 
as a technical partner. In early March 2013, Hansler began 
experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting. At 
the time, the cause of these symptoms was unknown. On 
March 13, Hansler’s physician completed a medical 
certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a 
frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and 
lasting for a probable duration of one month– or until about 
April 1, 2013.” App. 44. Hansler submitted the certification to 
Lehigh Valley as part of a formal request for leave under the 
Medical Leave Act. As a result of her condition, Hansler was 
unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25. 
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 Without seeking further information about the medical 
certification from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh 
Valley terminated Hansler at the end of her shift on March 
28. The basis for Hansler’s termination was absenteeism, 
including the five days she took off in March. Hansler 
reminded Lehigh Valley that she had requested time off under 
the Medical Leave Act, but Lehigh Valley informed her, for 
the first time, that her request had been denied. Following the 
last of her absences, Hansler learned of a letter dated March 
26 explaining that her request for “leave of absence (FMLA) 
for the period of 3/1/13-3/11/13” was denied because her 
“condition presently does not qualify as a serious health 
condition under the criteria set forth by the [Medical Leave 
Act].” App. 45. In early April 2013, after her dismissal, 
Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes and high blood 
pressure. She alleges that these previously undiagnosed and 
untreated conditions are what caused her March absences. 
 
 Hansler sued Lehigh Valley under the Medical Leave 
Act for interfering with her substantive rights to medical 
leave and for terminating her in retaliation for seeking leave. 
In her complaint, Hansler alleges she has chronic serious 
health conditions and argues that Lehigh Valley improperly 
denied her request for leave without providing her an 
opportunity to cure her medical certification. The District 
Court granted Lehigh Valley’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. It concluded that Hansler’s request for leave 
was defective because her medical certification indicated that 
her condition would last only one month, but the Medical 
Leave Act requires that a chronic serious health condition 
persist for an “extended period of time.” The District Court 
held that because the certification showed that Hansler was 
not entitled to leave, Lehigh Valley was not required to afford 
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Hansler a cure period and was permitted to terminate Hansler 
for her subsequent absences. That Hansler was later 
diagnosed with diabetes and high blood pressure was of no 
consequence. According to the Court, “[a]lthough the timing 
of events for plaintiff was, without question unfortunate, the 
fact remains that her diagnosis with diabetes and high blood 
pressure did not occur until after her leave request was denied 
and she was fired by defendant.” Hansler v. Lehigh Valley 
Health Network, No. 13-cv-03924, 2014 WL 1281132, at *10 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). Hansler filed this appeal.2 
 
II. 
 
 Congress passed the Medical Leave Act “to balance 
the demands of the workplace with the needs of families” and 
“to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical 
reasons.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Medical Leave Act 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pearson v. Sec’y 
Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 2015). To survive 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must 
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). A court must accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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carries out these objectives by providing that eligible 
employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 
12-month period if the employee has a “serious health 
condition” that makes the employee unable to perform the 
functions of her position. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). After a worker 
returns from leave, the worker is entitled to be reinstated to 
her previous position or an equivalent one. Id. § 2614(a)(1). 
 
 A “serious health condition” is one that involves 
inpatient care in a hospital or “continuing treatment by a 
health care provider.” Id. § 2611(11). In its implementing 
regulations, the Department of Labor defines “[c]ontinuing 
treatment by a health care provider” to include “chronic 
serious health condition[s]” that (i) “[r]equire[] periodic visits 
(defined as at least twice a year) for treatment by a health care 
provider,” (ii) “[c]ontinue[] over an extended period of time,” 
and (iii) “[m]ay cause episodic rather than a continuing period 
of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).” 29 
C.F.R. § 825.102. 
 
 Prior to taking leave, an employee must give her 
employer notice of the request for leave, “stat[ing] a 
qualifying reason for the needed leave.” Id. § 825.301(b). An 
employer may require its employees to support their requests 
for leave with a certification issued by a health care provider. 
29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). A “sufficient” medical certification must 
state (1) the date on which the serious health condition began, 
(2) the probable duration of the condition, (3) relevant 
medical facts, (4) a statement that the employee is unable to 
perform the functions of her position, (5) the dates and 
duration of any planned medical treatment, and (6) the 
expected duration of the intermittent leave. Id. § 2613(b). 
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 Significantly, the Department of Labor’s regulations 
govern how employers are to respond to perceived 
deficiencies in employee notices generally, and in medical 
certifications in particular. While an employee seeking 
FMLA leave must “state a qualifying reason for the needed 
leave” and fulfill notice requirements, the employee “does not 
need to expressly assert rights under the Act or even mention 
the FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b). Instead, in “any 
circumstance where the employer does not have sufficient 
information about the reason for an employee’s use of leave, 
the employer should inquire further of the employee . . . to 
ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-qualifying.” Id. 
§ 825.301(a). In addition, an employer “shall advise an 
employee whenever the employer finds a certification 
incomplete or insufficient, and shall state in writing what 
additional information is necessary to make the certification 
complete and sufficient.” Id. § 825.305(c). A certification is 
“incomplete” if the “employer receives a certification, but one 
or more of the applicable entries have not been completed.” 
Id. A certification is “insufficient” if the “employer receives a 
complete certification, but the information provided is vague, 
ambiguous, or non-responsive.” Id. If the employer 
determines that a certification is either incomplete or 
insufficient, it may deny the requested leave on the basis of 
an inadequate certification. But it may only do so if it has 
“provide[d] the employee with seven calendar days (unless 
not practicable under the particular circumstances despite the 
employee’s diligent good faith efforts) to cure any such 
deficiency.” Id.; see Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 
763 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he regulations do not 
authorize the employer to deny FMLA leave where the 
employee fails to provide a complete and sufficient 
certification but is not given the opportunity to cure the 
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deficiency.”). 
 
A. 
 
 Hansler’s first claim is that Lehigh Valley interfered 
with her rights under the Medical Leave Act by failing to 
afford her a chance to cure deficiencies in her medical 
certification. This claim is based on statutory text providing 
that employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the 
exercise of or attempt to exercise” rights granted under the 
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Moreover, “[a]ny violations of 
the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with” the 
exercise of an employee’s rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). To 
assert an interference claim, an employee must establish, 
among other things, that she was denied benefits under the 
Act. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 
 The District Court held that Hansler was not entitled to 
leave or a cure period because her certification was “invalid” 
and “negative on its face.” The Court reasoned that while 
Hansler’s certification requested leave for one month, this 
was not an “extended period of time,” and, therefore, her 
condition did not qualify as a chronic serious health 
condition. In other words, her certification was not merely 
insufficient or incomplete—it demonstrated that she did not 
have a chronic serious health condition. 
 
 Hansler does not argue on appeal that her certification 
established the “extended period of time” requirement, and 
9 
 
we do not decide that issue here.3 Instead, Hansler maintains 
she was entitled to the cure period set forth in the regulations 
because the certification was insufficient, rather than negative 
on its face. We agree. 
 
 The regulations make no reference to negative 
certifications, the basis on which the District Court rejected 
Hansler’s claim. Instead, they provide that whenever an 
employer finds a certification “incomplete” or “insufficient,” 
the employer shall so advise the employee and provide seven 
days to cure the deficiencies. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). A 
negative certification is a judicially crafted concept with roots 
in a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See 
Stoops v. One Call Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 
1998). In Stoops, the employee’s physician provided a 
medical certification stating that the employee was “not 
                                              
3 A chronic serious health condition is one that, among other 
things, “[c]ontinues over an extended period of time.” 29 
C.F.R. § 825.102. Neither the Act nor the regulations provide 
further clarity as to what “extended period of time” means. 
We have found that a three-year duration for an employee’s 
condition constitutes an extended period of time. See 
Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 
1997). Other courts have held that chronic illnesses “must 
exist for well more than a few weeks.” Taylor v. Autozoners, 
LLC, 706 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting 
Flanagan v. Keller Prods., Inc., No. 00-542-M, 2002 WL 
313138, at *7 (D.N.H. Feb. 25, 2002)). We will assume here, 
and Hansler does not argue otherwise, that a condition lasting 
for one month does not satisfy the “extended period of time” 
requirement. 
10 
 
presently incapacitated and would not have to work 
intermittently or on a reduced work schedule.” Id. at 311. The 
Seventh Circuit described this as a “negative certification” 
because a serious health condition is one that prevents an 
employee from performing his job, but the employee’s 
physician in Stoops explicitly stated that the employee could 
perform his job functions. Id. at 312-13. “Where an employer 
. . . requests from the employee and receives a physician’s 
certification that indicates that an employee’s serious health 
condition does not require him to miss work, the employer 
may rely on that certification.” Id. at 313. 
 
 Following Stoops, several other Courts of Appeals 
have discussed or alluded to negative certifications. In 
Hoffman v. Professional Med Team, the employee, like the 
one in Stoops, submitted a certification from a physician 
stating she would not need to work intermittently or on a less-
than-full schedule as a result of her condition. Hoffman, 394 
F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit explained 
that, “[t]o be valid, a certification must show that the 
employee’s serious health condition makes her unable to 
perform job functions.” Id. at 419. In Branham v. Gannett 
Satellite Information Network, Inc., the Sixth Circuit referred 
to a negative certification as one “indicating that [the 
employee] does not have a serious health condition that 
prevents her from performing her job.” 619 F.3d 563, 572 
(6th Cir. 2010). Similarly, the First Circuit found that an 
employer was justified in denying leave where the medical 
certification stated that the employee was “not incapacitated” 
and “disavowed the need for any leave.” Tayag v. Lahey 
Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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 We need not decide whether in certain circumstances a 
medical certification may be negative because, even if we 
were to agree with the cases finding negative certifications, 
we still would not find those cases persuasive here. The 
certifications in those cases contained affirmative statements 
from the employees’ physicians that the employees would not 
miss any work. To qualify for FMLA leave, however, an 
employee must have a “serious health condition,” defined as a 
physical or mental condition involving either inpatient care or 
continuing treatment involving a period of incapacity or 
treatment for incapacity. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(11), 
2612(a)(1)(D); 29 C.F.R. § 825.102. Thus, the certifications 
in those cases were facially incompatible with entitlement to 
FMLA leave. 
 
 In contrast, the certification here—which requested 
“intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times weekly . . . and 
lasting for a probable duration of one month,” App. 44—did 
not on its face disqualify Hansler from FMLA eligibility. 
Rather, because a “sufficient certification” for intermittent 
leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b) must address both “the 
expected duration of the intermittent leave” and the “probable 
duration of the condition,” and because the certification here 
failed to specify whether the “probable duration of one 
month” referred to the duration of the leave request, the 
duration of the medical condition, or both, the certification 
was not a “negative certification,” but was instead “vague, 
ambiguous, or non-responsive,” meeting the definition of 
“insufficient.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c); see Kauffman v. Fed. 
Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2005) 
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(rejecting argument that certification was negative where 
physician omitted the incapacity’s expected duration).4 
 In short, we hold today simply that when a 
certification submitted by an employee is “vague, ambiguous, 
or non-responsive” (or “incomplete,” for that matter) as to 
any of the categories of information required under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2613(b), the employer “shall advise [the] employee . . . 
what additional information is necessary to make the 
certification complete and sufficient” and “must provide the 
employee with seven calendar days . . . to cure any such 
deficiency.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). The plain and mandatory 
language of the statute and regulations requires no less. 
 
 Lehigh Valley’s additional arguments in support of a 
negative certification are unavailing. It emphasizes that the 
Medical Leave Act is not a forward-looking statute and “does 
not require an employer to be clairvoyant.” Lichtenstein v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
According to Lehigh Valley, the short duration of Hansler’s 
symptoms prior to her leave request provided no basis for it to 
                                              
4 Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler waived her argument 
concerning a distinction between the length of the requested 
leave and the expected duration of her condition by not 
raising it before the District Court. See Brennan v. Norton, 
350 F.3d 399, 415 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003). We disagree. 
Although Hansler did not mention this nuance in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2613(b), she did argue generally, with a supporting case and 
citations to regulations, that her certification was insufficient 
and that Lehigh Valley should have given her a chance to 
cure. Accordingly, Hansler has preserved the issue for appeal. 
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know that Hansler was suffering from a prolonged and 
chronic illness. This argument would carry more force if the 
issue at stake was notice. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92 
(explaining that to state a claim for interference, a plaintiff 
must give notice to the defendant of his or her intention to 
take leave). But no one disputes notice; Hansler provided 
Lehigh Valley with a certification specifically requesting 
leave under the Act. Thus, nothing in this opinion burdens 
employers with the troublesome task of predicting, on their 
own, the nature and trajectory of their employees’ illnesses. 
The relevant question here is not whether Lehigh Valley 
could have known Hansler was suffering from a chronic 
condition at the time she requested leave; instead, it is 
whether the certification was insufficient and/or incomplete. 
Receipt of an insufficient or incomplete certification triggers 
certain regulatory obligations on an employer that are 
unrelated to its understanding of the employee’s health 
condition.  
 
 Similarly, Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler’s 
post-termination diagnoses of diabetes and high blood 
pressure foreclose her ability to establish that she had a 
chronic serious health condition at the time she requested 
leave. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 
2001) (explaining that operative time for determining whether 
a particular condition qualifies as a serious health condition is 
the time that leave is requested or taken). Again, this misses 
the point. That Hansler was diagnosed with her illnesses after 
she was fired does not affect the determination of whether her 
medical certification was insufficient. 
 
 Having concluded that Hansler plausibly alleges her 
certification was insufficient rather than negative, the next 
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question is whether she states a claim for interference under 
the Act. Upon receipt of her insufficient certification, Lehigh 
Valley was required to (1) advise Hansler that her 
certification was insufficient, (2) state in writing what 
additional information was necessary to make it sufficient, 
and (3) provide her with an opportunity to cure before 
denying her request for leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). 
Lehigh Valley ignored these requirements and, instead, 
terminated Hansler without first notifying her that the request 
for leave had been denied. Assuming that she can prove she 
was denied benefits to which she was otherwise entitled, 
Hansler may premise her interference claim on these alleged 
regulatory violations. 
 
 Though our Court has not yet ruled on this issue, 
several district courts in this circuit have found interference 
claims following an employer’s breach of its obligations 
under § 825.305 where the employee established entitlement 
or likely entitlement to FMLA benefits.5 The few relevant 
                                              
5 See Patel v. Saint Vincent Health Ctr., No. 12-298, 2015 
WL 630260, at *13 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 12, 2015) (“[Employer] 
interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights by not informing her 
that the certification submitted by [the physician] was 
incomplete and insufficient.”); Herco v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., No. 10-796, 2011 WL 294493, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 
2011) (finding interference claim based on employee’s 
submission of an incomplete medical certification and 
employer’s failure to request additional information); 
Marrero v. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
455, 466 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[T]ermination is not an appropriate 
response for an inadequate certification. [The regulations] 
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decisions from the Courts of Appeals suggest that qualifying 
employees who allege harm arising from the employers’ 
failure to provide a cure period may assert a cause of action 
for interference. See Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 886-87; Darst v. 
Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 910 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Sorrell v. Rinker Materials Corp., 395 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
 
 Moreover, we find support for an interference claim 
based on this Court’s precedent concerning notice 
interference. In Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas 
Co., the plaintiff’s claim was based on his employer failing to 
advise him of his substantive rights under the Act in violation 
of regulatory requirements.6 364 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 
2004). The plaintiff there insisted that, if he had received the 
necessary information, “he would have been able to make an 
informed decision about structuring his leave and would have 
structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to 
preserve the job protection afforded by the Act.” Id. at 142-
43. We held this was a viable theory of recovery, explaining 
that the plaintiff “will show an interference with his right to 
                                                                                                     
provide[] that where an employer finds a certification 
incomplete, it must give the employee a reasonable 
opportunity to cure any deficiencies.”). 
6 The regulations contain a number of provisions requiring 
employers to provide employees with notice of their rights 
and obligations. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.300. For 
example, an employer covered by the Act must include a 
notice in its employee handbooks explaining benefits and 
leave rights. Id. § 825.300(a)(3). 
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leave under the FMLA . . . if he is able to establish that this 
failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise that right in 
a meaningful way, thereby causing injury.” Id. at 143. Put 
another way, we found a cause of action for notice 
interference in the event plaintiff was able to show prejudice 
as a result of the violation. Id. at 144; see also Ruder v. 
Pequea Valley Sch. Dist., 790 F. Supp. 2d 377, 394 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (finding interference claim where the defendant’s 
failure to advise plaintiff of his eligibility to take leave 
“rendered him unable to exercise his rights”); Schaar v. 
Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 496-
97 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding interference claim where plaintiff 
alleged that “had she been informed that FMLA was an 
option for her absence, she would have taken her absence as 
FMLA leave”). 
 
 The logic of Conoshenti naturally extends to an 
employer’s failure to comply with its regulatory obligations 
following receipt of an insufficient or incomplete medical 
certification. Just like employers must advise their employees 
of their rights under the Act, 29 C.F.R. § 825.300, they also 
must advise their employees of deficiencies in their medical 
certifications and provide them with an opportunity to cure, 
id. § 825.305(c). These modest burdens imposed on 
employers help ensure that employees are equipped with at 
least basic information about the Act’s requirements and have 
an opportunity to exercise their rights in a meaningful way. 
And to encourage employer compliance, the regulations 
provide injured employees with a cause of action for 
interference. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“Any violations of 
the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with, 
restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the 
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Act.”). If we were to find otherwise, employees would be left 
without a remedy. 
 
 Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, we 
conclude that Hansler states a claim for interference under 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). She alleges that, in violation of the 
regulations, Lehigh Valley failed to identify deficiencies in 
her medical certification and failed to provide her with an 
opportunity to cure. Hansler alleges she was prejudiced by 
these failures because, “[h]ad [Lehigh Valley] properly 
requested that [her] physician provide more information to 
show a serious health condition, [her] physician would have 
been [in] a position to provide the full diagnosis of [her] 
chronic health conditions.” App. 45. Instead of having the 
chance to exercise her rights in a meaningful way and 
demonstrate her entitlement to leave, Lehigh Valley fired her. 
As such, Hansler sufficiently alleges she was prejudiced as a 
result of Lehigh Valley’s regulatory violations. Indeed, 
Lehigh Valley does not appear to dispute a finding of 
prejudice, instead focusing its efforts on arguing that Hansler 
was not entitled to a cure period in the first instance—an 
argument we have rejected. Appellee Br. at 8 (“While it may 
be true that, had Hansler been given more time, she would 
have been able to offer additional information, this simply is 
not relevant to whether Hansler was entitled, under the 
FMLA regulations, to a cure period.”).  
 
Not only is our conclusion dictated by precedent as 
well as the statutory and regulatory text, but we believe the 
cure period makes abundant sense in this context. Faced with 
nascent symptoms from a yet-to-be diagnosed condition, an 
employee’s physician may need some additional time to 
provide the required elements of a sufficient certification, 
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including more specific information regarding relevant 
medical facts and the probable duration of the condition, the 
planned medical treatment, and the intermittent leave. 29 
U.S.C. § 2613(b). As this case illustrates, for an employee 
with an emerging condition, the difference between a medical 
certification that supports leave and one that is deficient 
might be a matter of days.7 
B. 
 
 Hansler’s second claim is that Lehigh Valley 
terminated her in retaliation for seeking leave. Retaliation 
claims arise out of the Medical Leave Act’s prohibition on 
employers “discharg[ing] or in any other manner 
discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any 
practice made unlawful.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see 29 
                                              
7 The sine qua non of eligibility for leave is not a diagnosis, 
but a qualifying health condition to which a physician may 
attest by providing the specified categories of information, 
such as “appropriate medical facts . . . regarding the 
condition,” the “probable duration of the condition,” and, 
where intermittent leave is requested, “the expected duration 
of the intermittent leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b). Where a 
certification is incomplete or insufficient as to any one of the 
categories, nothing in the statute or the implementing 
regulations prevents the cure period from functioning as a 
grace period for the employee to obtain such information; on 
the contrary, they compel it. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). And 
if the employee happens to learn the name of her condition in 
the interim, that may well provide additional support for her 
request, but it surely does not negate the validity of the grace 
period. 
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C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (prohibiting employers from 
“discriminating or retaliating against an employee or 
prospective employee for having exercised or attempt[ing] to 
exercise FMLA rights”). To state such a claim, Hansler must 
allege (1) she invoked her right to leave, (2) she suffered an 
adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was 
causally related to her invocation of rights. See Lichtenstein, 
691 F.3d at 301-02.  
 
 The District Court dismissed Hansler’s retaliation 
claim, finding she did not make a “valid” request for leave. 
This conclusion flowed from our holding that “firing an 
employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute 
interference with the employee’s FMLA rights as well as 
retaliation against the employee.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court 
reasoned that because her leave request was “premised upon 
the existence of a serious chronic health condition and her 
medical certification was a negative certification with respect 
to such a condition, [Hansler’s] leave request was not a valid 
request entitling her to FMLA leave and, accordingly, may 
not form the basis for an FMLA retaliation claim.” Hansler, 
2014 WL 1281132, at *13.  
 
 As we disagree with the underpinnings of this 
conclusion—i.e., the certification was negative and Hansler 
was not entitled to benefits under the Act—we hold that 
Hansler’s claim should not be dismissed at this stage. Hansler 
alleges she attempted to invoke her right to leave, she was not 
advised of deficiencies in her medical certification, she was 
not provided a cure period, and she was fired a few weeks 
later as a result of her leave request. Through discovery, 
Hansler might be able to show that Lehigh Valley had a 
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retaliatory motive and that the stated reason for termination 
was pretextual. See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 
F.3d 314, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2014); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 
309-10. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
